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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : Case No. 20010207-CA 
DEAN ALLEN MOGEN, : Priority No. 15 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ACQUIT DEFENDANT WHEN IT SUPPRESSED 
EVIDENCE AND ORDERED THE CASE 
DISMISSED, THE STATE MAY PROPERLY 
APPEAL THE DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18a-l(2) (a) 
(1999) 
Defendant argues that the trial court acquitted him when it 
suppressed evidence and dismissed his case. He contends that 
because the order entered constituted an acquittal rather than a 
final judgment of dismissal, the State is not permitted to 
appeal. To do so, he asserts, would violate both the statutory 
authority governing appeals and the prohibition against double 
jeopardy. See Br. of Appee. at 8-11. 
Defendant's argument fails because the trial court did not 
acquit him. The case on which defendant primarily relies, 
State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 
1 
815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991), demonstrates the fatal flaw in his 
argument. 
In Willard, the defendant filed a pretrial motion to 
suppress. The trial court denied the motion, and the case 
proceeded to a bench trial. Id. at 190. After both sides had 
presented their evidence and closing arguments, defendant renewed 
his suppression motion. The trial court granted the motion and 
dismissed the case. Id. at 191. The State appealed. This Court, 
in dismissing the appeal, observed that 
the order appealed from was clearly based on 
the trial court's assessment of the 
sufficiency of the evidence ruled admissible 
at trial. The trial judge, as factfinder, 
evaluated the State's evidence and, in 
effect, determined that it was legally 
insufficient to sustain a conviction. . . . 
Thus, although labeled a dismissal, the order 
appealed from . . . is an acquittal and not a 
"dismissal".... 
Id. at 191-92. In Willard, then, the trial court dismissal was 
in actuality an acquittal because the trial court ordered it only 
after a trial on the merits, after jeopardy had attached and the 
State had presented all its evidence. Accord State v. Jackson, 
857 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Utah App. 1993)(dismissal after the 
conclusion of the State's case constituted an unappealable 
acquittal where the trial court heard the State's case in chief 
and then found the evidence insufficient to make out a prima 
facie case); State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Utah App. 
1993)(ruling labeled "dismissal" was unappealable because court 
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ruled on sufficiency of evidence after trial on the merits). 
In contrast, the dismissal in this case followed a 
suppression hearing, not a trial on the merits. Here, rather 
than proceeding to a trial on the merits that would result in an 
acquittal or conviction, defendant chose to focus on a pretrial 
question of law and file a motion to suppress, on which he 
prevailed. In essence, he persuaded the trial court to dismiss 
his case on a basis which did not rely on his guilt or innocence. 
Consequently, he was neither acquitted nor convicted. 
Because defendant was not tried, the protection against 
double jeopardy is not implicated. See United States v. Scott, 
437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978)(delineating circumstances under which 
double jeopardy does not apply). A defendant is placed in 
jeopardy at the time a jury is empaneled and sworn or, in the 
case of a bench trial, when the first witness is sworn. Crist v. 
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37 (1978). Because the case against 
defendant was dismissed prior to trial, jeopardy did not attach. 
Cf. State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Harris, 517 P.2d 1313, -1314 (Utah 1974). Consequently, the 
State's appeal, following the trial court's grant of defendant's 
pretrial suppression motion, does not violate the prohibition 
against double jeopardy. 
Because defendant was not acquitted and double jeopardy did 
not attach, the State's right to appeal falls squarely within the 
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Utah Code's appellate authorization. That is, u[a]n appeal may 
be taken by the prosecution from . . . a final judgment of 
dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information 
following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial." Utah 
Code Ann. 77-18a-l(2) (a) (1999). Defendant's argument, therefore, 
must fail. 
POINT TWO 
IN APPEALING FROM THE ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL, THE STATE COMPLIED WITH 
THE APPLICABLE PROCEDURAL 
REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 77-18a-
1(2) (a) 
Defendant further argues that even if the trial court 
properly entered a final judgment of dismissal, the case should 
nonetheless be dismissed on appeal because the State failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements that case law has 
imported into Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a). See Br. of Appee. 
at 11. Specifically, he contends that "the record is devoid of 
any certification, by the trial court, [sic] that suppression of 
the methamphetamme and torch 'substantially impaired' the 
prosecution's ability to proceed." Id. at 14 (citing State v. 
Trover, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993)). 
Defendant's contention is incorrect. The document entitled 
"Motion and Order to Dismiss," prepared by the State and signed 
by the trial court, plainly states in the motion section: 
2. On February 26, 2001 the Court issued 
Finding of Facts [sic] and Conclusions of 
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Law, concluding that the officer did not have 
a legal basis to perform a search, thereby 
suppressing the evidence. 
3. Without the evidence, the State cannot 
proceed with the case. 
R. 62 at addendum A. The section of the document labeled "Order" 
states, "Upon consideration of the Motion of the Plaintiff filed 
herein, and good cause appearing therefore; it is hereby ordered 
that the above-entitled action is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice." R. 60 at addendum A. 
Defendant's argument that the trial court failed to certify 
that the State's case was substantially impaired rests on the 
unspoken premise that the motion to dismiss and the order of 
dismissal are two entirely separate, unrelated documents, which 
must not be read in tandem. See Br. of Appee. at 14. In 
actuality, the motion and order were prepared together and are 
contained in a single document; thus, the motion substantively 
informs the order. See addendum A. That is, the order 
specifically states that before dismissing the case, the trial 
court considered the motion and found that it contained good 
cause - the State's inability to proceed after the evidence had 
been suppressed - to enter the dismissal. With this wording, the 
trial court order incorporated the substance of the motion by 
reference to it. Cf. Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 916 (Utah App. 
1995)(psychological evaluation incorporated by reference into 
trial court memorandum decision); State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 
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217-18 (Utah 1992) (incorporated plea affidavit may form part of 
basis for finding rule 11 compliance). To dismiss this appeal 
because the trial court adopted the prosecution's certification 
of substantial impairment rather than articulating it anew would 
elevate form over function, give defendant a windfall, and deny 
the State its statutory right of review. 
Defendant further argues that the State has engaged in 
"prosecutorial manipulation" by moving for a dismissal and taking 
a direct appeal, rather than filing an interlocutory appeal from 
the suppression order. See Br. of Appee. at 14-15. For this 
proposition, he relies on two cases, neither of which, when 
properly understood, support his contention. 
First, defendant argues that State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2d 223 
(Utah 1985) is analogous to the present case and mandates the 
same outcome. In both instances, he asserts, although the State 
requested a dismissal and then filed an appeal from the 
dismissal, it was really seeking appellate review of an 
underlying suppression ruling. See Br. of Appee. at 14. Because 
in Waddoups, the Utah Supreme Court held that by requesting the 
dismissal, the State was not entitled to an appeal of right from 
the pretrial order, defendant argues the same result should 
follow here. Id. 
Waddoups, however, is a different case, decided under a 
different version of the Code. At that time, the Utah Code 
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provided only for discretionary appeals from pretrial suppression 
orders. 712 P.2d at 224. Rather than pursuing such an appeal 
and running the risk of the appellate court rejecting it, the 
State instead moved to dismiss the case with the intent of 
thereby gaining a nondiscretionary appeal of right from a final 
judgment of dismissal. The Court rejected this ploy because the 
State was "attempt[ing] to circumvent this Court's discretion" to 
hear an interlocutory appeal. Id. It noted further that u[t]o 
allow an appeal of right in such a circumstance would give the 
State an appeal of right from virtually every adverse pretrial 
order." Id. Such a result would comport with neither the 
language nor the intent of the controlling law. Id. 
In contrast, here the State engaged in no manipulative 
practice but rather simply followed the guidance of State v. 
Trover, 866 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1993). First, Trover limits 
review of "suppression orders as a matter of right only if they 
substantially impair the prosecution from proceeding with a 
case." Id. Second, Trover "require[s] the State to request 
dismissal with prejudice to obtain review of suppression orders 
on an appeal of right from a dismissal." Id. Thus, Troyer 
addresses the precise circumstances of this case, where the trial 
court's grant of a suppression motion devastated the State's 
case, rendering the prosecution unable to proceed. 
The mandates of Trover have been fulfilled here. The trial 
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court certified that the suppressed evidence substantially 
impaired the prosecution, and the State requested dismissal with 
prejudice. Id. Where the dual mandates of Troyer were plainly 
followed, the appeal presents no procedural anomaly and involves 
no prosecutorial manipulation. Consequently, the appeal should 
proceed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated both in the State's opening brief and 
m this reply brief, this Court should reverse the district court 
order dismissing the charges against defendant and remand the 
case for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this // day of February, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Public Defender, 418 East Main Street, #210, P.O. Box 537, 
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Addendum A 
G. Mark Thomas, #6664 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 8407 8 
Telephone: (435) 781-5435 
Fax: (435) 781-5428 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEAN ALLEN MOGEN, 
DOB: 04/25/1969, 
Defendant. 
MOTION AND ORDER 
TO DISMISS 
No. 001800211 
Judge John R. Anderson 
COMES NOW G. Mark Thomas, Deputy Uintah County Attorney, 
representing the above-named Plaintiff, and respectfully moves this 
Court for an Order dismissing the above-entitled action herein with 
prejudice. As basis for said motion, the State states as follows: 
1. On November 29, 2000 this matter came on for hearing en 
issues of suppression. 
2. On February 26, 2001 the Court issued Finding of Facts 
and Conclusions of Law, concluding that the officer did not have a 
legal basis to perform a search, thereby suppressing the evidence. 
3. Without the evidence, the State cannot proceed with the 
case. 
c \J 
WHEREFORE, the State hereby requests this matter be dismissed 
with prejudice, pursuant to State v. Trover, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 
1993) . 
DATED this ^ 2 _ day of February, 2001 
G. Mark Thomas 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
O R D E R 
Upon consideration of the Motion of the Plaintiff filed 
herein, and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. /" 
DATED this 'A* day of 7-//;-
Jpmi R. Andei 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
-or hand delivered a copy of the foregoing MOTION AND ORDER TO 
DISMISS, to Richard Mauro, Attorney for the Defendant, 43 East 400 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
DATED this .£ ""] ' day of February, 2001. 
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